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ALASKA’S RESPONSES TO THE
BLAKELY CASE
TERESA W. CARNS*
Following the 2004 Supreme Court decision in Blakely v.
Washington, states were forced to change their sentencing
practices. In the wake of the Blakely decision, Alaska has
experienced changes such as new sentencing laws, new appeals,
and courts of appeals decisions that have raised new legal issues.

I. INTRODUCTION
The June 24, 2004 United States Supreme Court decision in
1
Blakely v. Washington has changed sentencing practices across the
United States. The purpose of this brief comment is to describe
some of the changes in Alaska that flowed from the decision.
These changes have included new sentencing laws, a continuing
stream of new appeals, and Alaska Court of Appeals decisions that
have further unsettled the legal landscape.
With Justice Antonin Scalia writing for the majority, the Court
in Blakely held that a defendant had a Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial on factual findings that would increase the defendant’s
sentence, rather than allowing judicial decisions at a lower standard
2
of evidence to increase the sentence. In her dissent, Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor noted that Alaska and several other states had
sentencing systems that would be rendered unconstitutional by the
3
majority decision. Alaska’s presumptive sentencing scheme was
contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision because it allowed judges
to impose aggravated sentences for certain factors of the crime that

* Senior Staff Associate, Alaska Judicial Council, Anchorage, Alaska; B.A.,
Kalamazoo College, 1967.
1. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
2. Id. at 304, 313–14.
3. Id. at 323. Part IV.A of Justice O’Connor’s dissent cites Alaska as one of
several states that “have enacted guidelines systems . . . . Today’s decision casts
constitutional doubt over them all . . . .” Id.; see ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155 (2003)
(current version at ALASKA STAT.§ 12.55.155 (2006)).
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had not been presented to a jury for proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.4
5
An earlier Supreme Court case, Apprendi v. New Jersey, set
the stage for the Blakely decision. In Apprendi, the Court said:
“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
6
doubt.” The Court’s majority decision in Blakely held that the
Washington trial judge’s decision to impose extra time for an
aggravating factor in the defendant’s kidnapping case violated the
same Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial as had the trial judge’s
7
decision in Apprendi.
II. ALASKA’S INITIAL RESPONSES
Alaska prosecutors immediately took action in 2004 to comply
with the new requirements. They started to present potential
8
If the
aggravating factors to grand juries for indictment.
aggravators were approved by the grand jury, or were added later
9
in the case, prosecutors presented them at the jury trial. Most
cases continued to be negotiated; in these, prosecutors asked for a
10
Blakely waiver when appropriate.
Early on, one judge found Alaska’s presumptive sentencing
11
system unconstitutional as a result of Blakely. Judge Michael
Wolverton in Anchorage said in a 2004 opinion that “the most
appropriate resolution of the issues at this juncture, and until the
Alaska Legislature has had the opportunity to remedy the myriad
concerns raised by Blakely v. Washington (citation omitted), is to
declare that Alaska’s presumptive sentencing scheme as set forth in
12
Title 12 is unconstitutional.” Judge Wolverton based his decision

4. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155.
5. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
6. Id. at 490.
7. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303–05.
8. Blakely in Alaska, THE SENTENCING GUIDELINE (National Association of
Sentencing Commissions, Washington, D.C.), Feb. 2005, at 3, available at
http://www.ussc.gov/states/NASC_030205.pdf. The section in the newsletter is
based on an interview with Susan Parkes, Deputy Attorney General for Criminal
Affairs. Interview information available from the Alaska Judicial Council.
9. Id.
10. Id.; see ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(f)(2) (2006).
11. State v. Herrmann, No. 3AN-S02-11320-CR (Alaska Super. Ct. Oct. 6,
2004).
12. Id. at 1.
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in part on a Utah federal case, United States v. Croxford,13 in which
the court said that its only viable option was to treat the U.S.
guidelines “as unconstitutional in their entirety . . . and sentence
14
Croxford between the statutory minimum and maximum.”
On August 4, 2006, the court of appeals vacated Judge
Wolverton’s decision and remanded the case to the superior court
15
for sentencing. The court said:
It is true that Alaska’s pre-2005 presumptive sentencing law is
flawed in certain respects. Specifically, some of the provisions of
the pre-2005 sentencing law do not comply with the right to jury
trial . . . . Because Herrmann has not shown that he is prejudiced
by any of the Blakely flaws in our pre-2005 presumptive
sentencing law, the superior court decided a purely hypothetical
controversy when it declared the entire pre-2005 presumptive
16
sentencing law to be unconstitutional.

The State’s most important response was a new sentencing
17
plan filed at the beginning of the 2005 legislative session. In
essence, the new law replaced the single presumptive sentences
with a range of presumptive sentences for each offense and
18
codified the right to jury trial for alleged aggravators. The
legislature passed the bill quickly, and it became effective when
19
Governor Murkowski signed it on March 22, 2005.
Alaskans varied in their responses to the legislation. The
governor’s press release said that “[j]udges will have the discretion
to weigh the facts and circumstances of individual defendants to
determine an appropriate sentence within the presumptive
20
range.” The Department of Law, chief drafters of the new bill,
said that the sentencing ranges adopted by legislators were “in
21
keeping with the spirit of the [U.S.] Supreme Court decision.”
Defense attorneys observed that the new legislation would result in
more incarceration for defendants by subjecting them to higher
22
sentences based on less evidence. They noted that defendants
13. 324 F. Supp. 2d 1230 (D. Utah 2004).
14. Id. at 1242.
15. State v. Herrmann, 140 P.3d 895 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006).
16. Id. at 895–96.
17. See S.B. 56, 2005 Leg., 24th Sess. (Alaska 2005).
18. See id.
19. Press Release, Governor Frank Murkowski, Murkowski Signs Bill Fixing
Criminal
Sentencing
Statutes
(Mar.
22,
2005),
available
at
http://www.law.state.ak.us/pdf/press/pr-blakely-signing.pdf.
20. Id.
21. Matt Volz, Judges Get More Sentencing Leeway, ANCHORAGE DAILY
NEWS, Mar. 23, 2005, at B5.
22. Id.
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would be more reluctant to plead guilty because sentences in
negotiated cases would be less certain.23
III. TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF
PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCING - 1980 TO 2005
Alaska courts began to structure judicial sentencing decisions
with one of the supreme court’s earliest sentence appeals.24 In State
25
v. Chaney, the court required judges to consider the seriousness of
the offense, the offender’s prior record, likelihood of rehabilitation,
protection of the public, harm to the victim and the community,
deterrence, community condemnation and reaffirmation of societal
26
norms, and restoration of the victim and the community. For the
next several years, the court referred frequently to these criteria in
27
its sentencing decisions.
In 1978, Alaska’s legislature adopted a criminal code paired
with a presumptive sentencing scheme that replaced the former
28
Both the code and the
indeterminate sentencing system.
29
sentencing system took effect on January 1, 1980. Derived from

23. Id.
24. In 1969, the legislature granted the Alaska Supreme Court authority to
review the length of trial court sentences. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.120(a)
(2006).
25. 477 P.2d 441 (Alaska 1970).
26. Id. at 443.
27. E.g., State v. Graybill, 695 P.2d 725, 727 (Alaska 1985) (“We reverse the
court of appeals and reinstate the original sentence based on the trial judge’s
discretion under the Chaney criteria . . . .”).
28. For a detailed discussion of the then-new legislation see Barry Stern,
Presumptive Sentencing in Alaska, 2 ALASKA L. REV. 227 (1985).
Until the presumptive sentencing legislation took effect on January 1, 1980,
Alaska statutes called for judges to impose a specific term for a sentence within
broad ranges. Once the term was imposed, other statutes governed parole
eligibility and good time, but the defendant would not serve more than the specific
sentence imposed by the judge. Judges could suspend part or all of the sentence.
Under presumptive sentencing, the statutes called for either a sentence within a
statutory minimum/maximum range (most first felony offender Class B and C), or
the imposition of a specified presumptive sentence (more serious or repeat
offenders). The system could be categorized as a “mixed” system, combining a
structured sentencing system and an indeterminate system (because discretionary
parole still operated under specific circumstances). See Jon Wool, Beyond
Blakely: Implications of the Booker Decision for State Sentencing Systems, 2005
VERA INST. OF JUST. STATE SENTENCING AND CORR. POL’Y & PRAC. REV. 2 (Feb.
2005).
29. See Stern, supra note 28 at 230 n.9. The Judicial Council, at the request of
the legislature, reported on 1974–1976 felony sentencing patterns throughout the
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work by the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Criminal
Sentencing,30 presumptive sentencing called for a combination of
31
structured sentencing and judicial discretion.
Presumptive sentencing set a single term that, absent other
factors, was presumed to be the appropriate sentence. The new
sentences applied to repeat Class B and C (lesser) offenders, to all
Class A felons, and to unclassified felons convicted of sexual
32
offenses. Presumptive sentences for subsequent felony offenders
in all categories also had presumptive sentences specified by law,
with statutory aggravators and mitigators available to adjust the
33
sentences.
First offenders convicted of Class B and C felonies did not
34
have presumptive sentences, and they were eligible for
discretionary parole after they had served one-third of the active
state to provide a basis for the Criminal Code Commission’s work. See ALASKA
JUDICIAL COUNCIL, ALASKA FELONY SENTENCING PATTERNS: A MULTIVARIATE
STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS
(1977),
available
at
http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/reports/akfel74.pdf [hereinafter ALASKA FELONY
SENTENCING]. At the request of the Criminal Code Revision Subcommission, the
Council reviewed other possible sentencing schemes, including mandatory
minimums and flat time, and recommended that presumptive sentencing be
adopted.
30. THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING,
FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT (1976).
31. Stern, supra note 28, at 227.
32. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125 (1980) (current version at ALASKA STAT. §
12.55.125 (2006)). A handful of the most serious offenses had mandatory
minimum sentences and fell outside of the presumptive sentencing scheme. The
legislature assigned a twenty-year minimum for Murder 1, § 12.55.125(a) (1980)
(current version at ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(a) (2006)), a ten-year minimum for
Murder 2, and a five-year minimum for Kidnapping, § 12.55.125(b) (1980)
(current version at ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(b) (2006)). In 1995, the legislature
created the offense of Felony Driving While Intoxicated (a Class C offense) and
assigned a mandatory minimum sentence of 120 days of incarceration for the first
felony DWI. § 28.35.030(n) (2006).
For a more detailed description of sentencing structure, sentencing ranges,
and other provisions, see JUDICIAL COUNCIL, ALASKA FELONY PROCESS: 1999, at
35–37 (2004), available at http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/reports/Fel99FullReport.pdf
[hereinafter ALASKA FELONY PROCESS].
33. § 12.55.155(f) (1980) (current version at ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(f)
(2006)). With specific findings, a judge also could refer the case for sentencing to
a three-judge panel that could impose the original presumptive sentence or any
sentence within the statutory range. § 12.55.165 (1980) (current version at ALASKA
STAT. § 12.55.165 (2006)).
34. See § 12.55.125(d)–(e) (1980) (current version at ALASKA STAT. §
12.55.125(d)–(e) (2006)).
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time imposed.35 The legislation eliminated discretionary parole for
those sentenced presumptively, at least during the period
36
attributable to the presumptive sentence. The legislature made
37
38
further changes that took effect in 1982 and 1983–1984.
39
Case law quickly built on the presumptive sentencing
structure to set limits to the possible range of sentences for most
40
41
first offenders. The legislation also codified the Chaney criteria.
Subsequent case law required judges to consider these factors at
most points when they sentenced, whether they were looking at the
magnitude of difference made by an aggravator or mitigator, at
sentencing on a probation revocation, or at imposing the original
42
sentence.
The 1980 sentencing statute’s opening “Declaration of
Purpose” stated that “[t]he legislature finds that the elimination of
unjustified disparity in sentences and the attainment of reasonable
uniformity in sentences can best be achieved through a sentencing
43
framework fixed by statute as provided in this chapter.” Later

35. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, §§ 20.020–20.025 (2007).
36. See § 12.55.125(g) (1980) (current version at ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(g)
(2006)). Separate provisions could apply to the aggravated portions of sentences
or consecutive sentences. Id.
37. The major change in 1982 was including all drug offenses under the
presumptive sentencing plan. See, e.g., § 12.55.125(b) (1980) (current version at
ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(b) (2006)).
38. See id. In 1983, the legislature revised the charging and sentencing
structure for sexual offenses, increasing the penalties substantially. § 12.55.125(i)
(1980) (current version at ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(i) (2006)).
39. The legislature created a court of appeals to handle only criminal cases,
and the court began its work in late 1980. See Susanne D. DiPietro, The
Development of Appellate Sentencing Law in Alaska, 7 ALASKA L. REV. 265, 276–
77 (1990).
40. Stern, supra note 28, at 255–66 (discussing Austin v. State, 627 P.2d 657
(Alaska Ct. App. 1981) (per curiam)).
41. See § 12.55.005 (1980) (current version at ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.005
(2006)).
42. See, e.g., Bossie v. State, 835 P.2d 1257, 1258 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992) (“The
sentencing court must . . . determine whether this mitigating factor, analyzed in
the light of the sentencing criteria contained in . . . State v. Chaney (citation
omitted) calls for some adjustment of the presumptive term.”); State v. Wentz, 805
P.2d 962, 964 (Alaska 1991) (“Applying the foregoing principles [derived from
Chaney] to the case at bar, it is apparent that the trial court was permitted . . . to
increase Wentz’s presumptive five-year term by as much as fifteen years,
depending upon the number and severity of statutory aggravating factors
present . . . .”).
43. § 12.55.005 (1980) (current version at ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.005 (2006)).
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decisions from the court of appeals affirmed these purposes of the
new sentencing scheme.44 The intent was to eliminate both the
ethnicity-related disparities found in sentencing studies in the 1970s
45
and the disparities based on the identity of the judge. Reviews of
46
47
48
felony sentencing practices in 1980, 1984–1987, and 1999
showed that presumptive sentencing had apparently been
successful at eliminating the disparities associated with the
49
ethnicities of presumptively sentenced defendants. However, the
1999 data showed disparities for Black and Native defendants in
50
non-presumptive drug sentences.
IV. ALASKA’S NEW
SENTENCING SYSTEM, PRESUMPTIVE RANGES
The new law sets a range of permissible sentences for each
offense. It expands the scope of presumptive sentencing to all
51
felony convictions, including Class B and C first offenders.
Typically, the new ranges start at the previous presumptive
52
sentence (if there was one) and go up to several years above that.
53
Mitigators can still be argued to reduce the sentence. Aggravators
44. See, e.g., Juneby v. State, 641 P.2d 823, 833 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982)
(“[U]nless a measured and restrained approach is taken in the adjustment of
presumptive sentences . . . the potential for irrational disparity in sentencing
would threaten to become reality . . . .”), modified and superceded, Juneby v.
State, 665 P.2d 30 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
45. See ALASKA FELONY SENTENCING, supra note 29, at 40–41.
46. ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, ALASKA FELONY SENTENCES: 1980 (1982),
available at http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/reports/akfel80.pdf [hereinafter ALASKA
FELONY SENTENCES: 1980].
47. Teresa White Carns & John Kruse, ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL,
ALASKA’S PLEA BARGAINING BAN RE-EVALUATED at 149–52 (1991).
48. ALASKA FELONY PROCESS, supra note 32.
49. See, e.g., ALASKA FELONY SENTENCES: 1980, supra note 46, at 57 (“The
present analysis of 1980 offenses reveals that racially disproportionate sentencing
outcomes have been totally eliminated.”).
50. ALASKA FELONY PROCESS, supra note 32, at 1, 277.
51. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(e) (2006) (“[A] defendant convicted of a
class C felony may be sentenced to a definite term of imprisonment of not more
than five years, and shall be sentenced to a definite term within the following
presumptive ranges . . . .”).
52. See infra Table: Alaska: Current Presumptive Terms Compared to
Presumptive Ranges in Senate Bill 56.
53. E.g., § 12.55.125(d)(1) (“[T]he defendant is required to serve an active
term of imprisonment within the range specified in this paragraph, unless the
court finds . . . a mitigation factor . . . .”). Aggravating and mitigating factors are
located in ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155 (2006).
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that would take the sentence above the presumptive range must
meet Blakely requirements.54
The presumptive ranges are set out in the following table, with
the new ranges in bold letters and the former presumptive sentence
(if any) in parentheses. Most felony convictions are for Class C
and Class B offenses such as Thefts, Frauds, Misconduct Involving
a Controlled Substance, and less serious assaults and sexual
offenses. First offenders in these categories now have presumptive
55
ranges for their sentences, in addition to case law guidance. Class
56
C first offenders have a range of zero to two years, and Class C
sex offenders (who formerly had a typical range of zero to two
57
years) have a presumptive one to two year range. Class B first
offenders have a presumptive range of one to three years, similar
58
to the previous “court-made law” that set one to three years as an
appropriate sentencing range. First offenders convicted of Class B
sexual offenses now have a two to four-year presumptive range
59
rather than the earlier one to three-year court-made law range.
The presumptive ranges apply to the total sentence imposed,
60
including any suspended time. Active time (i.e., the amount of
time that the defendant must spend incarcerated) and suspended
time together cannot total more than the upper end of the
61
presumptive range. The presumptive ranges for second and
subsequent felony B and C offenders, and for all other offenders
54. See § 12.55.155.
55. See § 12.55.125(d) (Class B felonies); § 12.55.125(e) (Class C felonies).
56. § 12.55.125(e)(1).
57. See infra Table: Alaska: Current Presumptive Terms Compared to
Presumptive Ranges in Senate Bill 56. An interesting historical note is that the
Supreme Court’s Sentencing Guidelines Committee that operated between 1978
and 1982 drafted guidelines for first offender Class B and C offenders. The draft
guidelines for Class C first offenders call for probation to sixty days for Property
and Drug offenses without aggravating circumstances, and generally for a range of
“probation to two (2) years.” For Class B offenders, the proposed range was
probation to four years. The new presumptive range for Class B offenders is
narrower than was the proposed guideline, but the Class C presumptive range is
identical to the earlier proposal. The draft guidelines were not adopted, although
the committee did adopt guidelines for drug offenses that were used from 1980 to
1982. Further information is available from the Alaska Judicial Council.
58. See infra Table: Alaska: Current Presumptive Terms Compared to
Presumptive Ranges in Senate Bill 56.
59. Id.
60. § 12.55.125(n). For sentences imposed consecutively or concurrently the
new legislation specifies that “presumptive term” in that section now means the
middle of the presumptive range. § 12.55.127(d)(3) (2006).
61. § 12.55.125(n).
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who were sentenced presumptively under the earlier law, begin at
the former presumptive sentence and go up by varying amounts.
The new ranges will permit judges to sentence anywhere within the
range without calling upon aggravating or mitigating factors to
justify their sentences.

Sex

n/a

Crim neg hom of
child
(0; 1 to 3 by courtmade law)
2 to 4

n/a

(0; 1 to 3 by courtmade law)
2 to 4
{5-15}
(0; 1 to 3 by courtmade law)
1 to 3
(SIS permitted if
prison imposed as
condition)
(0)
1 to 2
{2-12}

Class B Felony Sex
Offense

Class B Felony

(2)
2 to 5
{8-15}

(3)
3 to 6
{12-20}

n/a

(10)
10 to 14
{15-30}

n/a

Class C Felony

(0)
0 to 2
(SIS permitted)

Felony guiding
(2)
crimes
n/a
2 to 4
(1)
1 to 2
Numbers in parentheses are the presumptive terms and maximums that apply to crimes committed before March 23, 2005
Numbers in bold show the 2005 presumptive ranges and new maximum
Numbers in italics and brackets for sex offenders show 2006 changes
Alaska Department of Law, February 2005—Updated by the Alaska Judicial Council, November 2006

Class C Felony Sex
Offense

(4)
4 to 7

(5)
5 to 8
{10-25}

(10)
10 to 14

Weapon, serious
injury, or police
victim
(7)
7 to 11

(15)
15 to 20
{30-40}

(20)
20 to 30
{35-45}

Sex Felony with a
Prior Sex Felony

(3)
3 to 5

(3)
3 to 6
{15-25}

(6)
6 to 10

(10)
10 to 14
{20-35}

(15)
15 to 20

(15)
15 to 20
{35-50}

(25)
25 to 35
{40-60}

Third+ Felony

n/a

(6)
6 to 10
{99}

n/a

(15)
15 to 20
{99}

n/a

(20)
20 to 30
{99}

(30)
30 to 40
{99}

Sex Felony with
Two Prior Sex
Felonies

(5)

(10)
{99}

(10)

(20)
{99}

(20)

(30)
{99}

(40)
99

Max

10

Class A Felony
(5)
5 to 8

(15)
15 to 20
{30-45}

Weapon or serious
injury
(10)
12 to 16
{25-35}
(10)
12 to 16
{25-35}

(5)
5 to 8
{15-30}

(8)
8 to 12
{20-35}

Second Felony

First Felony (special
crimes)

Weapon or serious
injury
(10)
10 to 14
{25-35}

Class A Felony Sex
Offense

Unclassified
Offense

First Felony

Alaska: Current Presumptive Terms Compared to Presumptive Ranges in Senate Bill 56
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An example will help clarify these changes. A first felony
offender convicted of one count of Robbery 1 with a weapon under
the previous code (a Class A offense; see Table), who did not have
any aggravating or mitigating factors would have had a
62
presumptive sentence of seven years. The offender would have
been eligible for release on good time after serving two-thirds of
the sentence, assuming no discipline while incarcerated that would
have reduced the amount of good time. If the judge had wished to
impose additional probationary time to provide longer supervision,
he or she could not have done so without alleged and proven (by
clear and convincing evidence) aggravators that would allow
63
additional suspended time to serve.
Under the new presumptive ranges, the judge could sentence
the same offender to any length of sentence within the seven-to
64
eleven-year range. If the judge sentenced the offender to eight
years of active time to serve, the judge could also impose up to
three years of suspended time and require that the offender be
65
supervised on probation for that period of time.
Statutory provisions for mitigators changed very little under
66
the new legislation. The legislature added two new mitigators, but
it did not otherwise alter existing statutes. The active time cannot
go below the bottom of the range without allegation and proof by
67
clear and convincing evidence of mitigating factors. If the low end

62. § 12.55.125(c)(2)(A) (2004) (current version at ALASKA STAT. §
12.55.125(c) (2006)).
63. See § 12.55.155 (2004) (current version at ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155
(2006)).
64. § 12.55.125(c)(2)(A) (2006).
65. See § 12.55.125(o) (“[T]he court shall impose . . . (2) suspended
imprisonment of three years and a minimum period of probation supervision of 10
years for conviction of a class A or class B felony . . . .”).
66. The new mitigators allow the judge to decrease the sentence under some
circumstances if the defendant is part of or has completed a state-approved
treatment program, § 12.55.155(d)(17); additionally, the new mitigators permit a
decrease in sentence for defendants who suffer “from a mental disease or
defect . . . that significantly affected the defendant’s behavior but is not sufficient
for a complete defense.” § 12.55.155(d)(18). Again, the mitigator can only be
used under limited circumstances.
67. See § 12.55.155(d)(1) (“The following factors shall be considered by the
sentencing court if proven in accordance with this section, and may allow
imposition of a sentence below the presumptive range . . . .”). The judge also can
refer the case for sentencing to a three-judge panel which may “in the interest of
justice sentence the defendant to any definite term of imprisonment up to the
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of the range is four years or less, the court may impose any
sentence below the presumptive range for factors in mitigation
68
(including probation). If the low end of the range is more than
four years, the court can sentence up to fifty percent below the low
69
end of the range.
The larger changes came in the provisions for aggravating
offenses above the new presumptive ranges. Aggravators now fall
70
into two categories: those that must be proved to a jury and those
that can still continue to be proved to the judge by clear and
71
convincing evidence. In the latter category are the eight “prior
conviction” aggravators excluded from the jury requirement by the
72
These include aggravators related to the
Blakely decision.
73
number of the defendant’s prior felony convictions; the
74
defendant’s probation, parole, release or furlough status; the
defendant’s history of juvenile adjudications for adult felony
75
equivalents; the defendant’s history of assaultive behavior and
76
convictions of offenses similar to the current conviction; a history
77
of more serious offenses; or a history of five or more convictions
for Class A misdemeanors (a new aggravator added in the present
78
legislation).
Aggravators that must be proved to a jury comprise all of the
other aggravators specified in the prior statute and carried over in
the new legislation. Those factors for which the prosecutor seeks a
sentence higher than the presumptive range must “be presented to
79
a trial jury under procedures set by the court” and be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecutor must give the
maximum term provided for the offense or to any sentence authorized under AS
12.55.015.” § 12.55.175(c).
68. § 12.55.155(a)(1).
69. § 12.55.155(a)(2).
70. § 12.55.155(f)(2).
71. § 12.55.155(f)(1).
72. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004) (“Other than the fact of a
prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.” (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 436, 490 (2000))).
73. § 12.55.155(c)(15).
74. § 12.55.155(c)(12), (20).
75. § 12.55.155(c)(19).
76. § 12.55.155(c)(21).
77. § 12.55.155(c)(7)–(8).
78. § 12.55.155(c)(31).
79. § 12.55.155(f)(2). The section also provides that the defendant can waive
trial on the factor, can stipulate to the existence of the factor, or can consent to
have the factor proven under the clear and convincing evidence standard. Id.
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defendant and court written notice “of the intent to establish a
factor in aggravation.”80
The aggravators that must go to a jury after March 23, 2005
(without a waiver from the defendant) include approximately
81
twenty-seven different situations specified in section 12.55.155.
Behavior that involved a group of three or more persons (with the
82
defendant as the leader), organized groups of five or more
83
84
persons, or gangs are all aggravating factors that must be proven
to a jury. Various aggravators involving financial remuneration
from the offense such as a pecuniary incentive beyond that
85
inherent in the offense or substantial monetary gain with little risk
86
of prosecution and punishment must go to the jury. Injury to a
87
88
person other than an accomplice, the victim’s vulnerability,
89
90
domestic-related offenses, and involvement of minors also are
among the aggravators subject to jury trial.
Once the jury has accepted the aggravating factor as proved
beyond a reasonable doubt, the judge fashions the sentence using
the criteria established under existing law. Even if the jury finds a
guilty verdict on the aggravator, the judge is not obliged to impose
91
If the judge does decide to increase the
a higher sentence.
sentence, further case law structures the decision by use of the
92
Chaney criteria and various other case law limitations.
Most of the offenses set out in the criminal code retained the
same statutory maximum penalties under the new law. The
changes that occurred, both in maximum penalties and in increased
penalties and restrictions for some offenses, were unrelated to the
Blakely provisions. In particular, the laws governing penalties for
93
sexual offenses were revised in 2005 and again in 2006. The
80. Id.
81. § 12.55.155.
82. § 12.55.155(c)(3).
83. § 12.55.155(c)(14).
84. § 12.55.155(c)(29).
85. § 12.55.155(c)(11).
86. § 12.55.155(c)(16).
87. § 12.55.155(c)(1).
88. § 12.55.155(c)(5).
89. § 12.55.155(c)(18).
90. § 12.55.155(c)(23)(B), 27(A)–(B).
91. See §12.55.155(c) (“The following factors shall be considered by the
sentencing court if proven in accordance with this section, and may allow
imposition of a sentence above the presumptive range set out in AS 12.55.125.”
(emphasis added)).
92. See DiPietro, supra note 39, at 280 n.99.
93. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125 Notes to Decisions (2006).
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presumptive ranges set in 2005 were boosted substantially in 2006.94
In addition, requirements for longer suspended sentences and
95
probation terms for sexual offenses were imposed, and offenders
were ordered to submit to polygraph testing under some
96
circumstances.
V. ANTICIPATED EFFECTS OF THE BILL
A. Reduction of disparities
The Senate’s Letter of Intent,97 which was incorporated into
the legislation, noted that the legislature intended to preserve “the
basic structure of Alaska’s presumptive sentencing system, which is
98
designed to avoid disparate sentences.” This language echoes that
in the declaration of purpose in the 1978 legislation, “[t]he
legislature finds that the elimination of unjustified disparity in
sentences . . . can best be achieved through a sentencing framework
99
fixed by statute.” The Judicial Council findings of unexplainable
ethnic disparities in non-presumptive drug sentences in the 1999
database would support the legislature’s continuing concern about
100
Because the Council found no unwarranted
disparities.
disparities in presumptive sentences and the new system
94. See id.
95. § 12.55.125(o). This provision was added by the 2006 amendments. §
12.55.125 app. at 686.
96. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.100(e) (2006).
97. The full text of the Letter of Intent is:
It is the intent of the legislature in passing this bill to preserve the basic
structure of Alaska’s presumptive sentencing system, which is designed
to avoid disparate sentences. With this bill the legislature sets out a
sentencing framework, subject to judicial adjustment for statutory
aggravating or mitigating factors that are determined in a manner that is
constitutional under the decision of the U. S. Supreme Court in Blakely
v. Washington. The single, definite presumptive terms set out in current
law can unduly constrain the sentencing process, particularly under the
mandates of Blakely v. Washington. Although the presumptive terms
are being replaced by presumptive ranges, it is not the intent of this bill
in doing so to bring about an overall increase in the amount of active
imprisonment for felony sentences. Rather, the bill is intended to give
judges the authority to impose an appropriate sentence, with an
appropriate amount of probation supervision, by taking into account the
considerations set out in AS 12.55.005 [sic] and 12.55.015. ALASKA
SENATE JOURNAL, S.24-56, 1st. Sess., at 0102–03 (2005) [hereinafter
ALASKA SENATE JOURNAL].
98. Id. at 0102.
99. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.005 (1978) (current version at ALASKA STAT. §
12.55.005 (2006)).
100. ALASKA FELONY PROCESS, supra note 32, at 1.
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emphasizes uniformity in the context of the presumptive ranges,101
it could be anticipated that ranges might help to reduce sentencing
disparity.
B. Increased judicial discretion
The Letter of Intent emphasized the legislature’s desire “to
102
give judges the authority to impose an appropriate sentence.”
The need for more discretion for judges was emphasized in a news
column by then-Attorney General Gregg Renkes which was
103
published at about the same time that the bill was introduced.
Mr. Renkes characterized the Blakely decision as shifting “much of
the decision-making in sentencing to jurors who probably serve on
only one felony case in their lives, rather than judges who deal with
felony sentencing every day . . . making it much more difficult for
104
judges to give stiff sentences for aggravated crimes.”
C. No increase in sentence lengths
The Senate Letter of Intent also noted that the legislature did
105
not intend to increase the overall amount of active imprisonment.
When the Department of Corrections (DOC) submitted its second
set of fiscal notes (analysis provided to the legislature about the
fiscal impacts of bills that the legislature is considering), it said that
it did not expect increased sentence lengths or added burdens for
106
its work. To support its fiscal notes, the DOC cited its research
that suggested that the average un-suspended incarceration for first
felony Class B and C offenders fell within the middle of the new
107
ranges. For 4097 Class C convicted offenders sentenced between
January 1, 2001 and December 31, 2004, the DOC showed an
108
The Table
average un-suspended incarceration of 366 days.
shows that the new range of sentences for first offender Class C

101. Id. at 3.
102. ALASKA SENATE JOURNAL, supra note 97, at 0103.
103. Gregg Renkes, Ruling Handcuffs Alaska’s Judges, ANCHORAGE DAILY
NEWS, Jan. 19, 2005, at B4.
104. Id.
105. ALASKA SENATE JOURNAL, supra note 97, at 0103.
106. ALASKA DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, FISCAL NOTE SIX, S.24-56, 1st. Sess., at 2
(2005) [hereinafter FISCAL NOTE SIX]; ALASKA DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, FISCAL
NOTE SEVEN, S.24-56, 1st. Sess., at 2 (2005) [hereinafter FISCAL NOTE SEVEN].
107. FISCAL NOTE SIX, supra note 106, at 1; FISCAL NOTE SEVEN, supra note
106, at 1.
108. FISCAL NOTE SIX, supra note 106, at 2.
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convictions was zero to two years.109 For Class B convictions, the
new range was one to three years of un-suspended incarceration,
110
and the results were similar to the previous sentences. DOC data
showed a mean sentence of 864 days (2.4 years) for the 1155
111
offenders between January 1, 2001 and December 31, 2004.
A second source of data about average sentence lengths for
Class B and C first offenders was the data underlying the Alaska
112
Data
Judicial Council’s report, Alaska Felony Process: 1999.
from that report, submitted to the Alaska House Finance
113
Committee on February 16, 2005, showed that the typical Class C
first felony offender received a mean sentence of 163 days of un114
suspended incarceration. The first offender Class C felons in the
Judicial Council data appeared to receive an average sentence of
115
only about half of that in the DOC average. The Council’s data
from 1999 showed a mean sentence of 609 days of un-suspended
incarceration for Class B first felony offenders, or about fifty
116
perent less than the DOC average. The differences between the
two calculations of sentence length could be related to the different
data sets used, or it could be related to increases in average
sentences in cases filed after 1999.
D. More suspended sentences accompanied by probation
117
A Department of Law summary of the bill characterized the
legislative intent language as “the legislature intended to give
judges authority to impose suspended periods of incarceration.
This is important because the legislature adopted presumptive
118
The
ranges that start at the former presumptive term.”

109. Supra Table: Alaska: Current Presumptive Terms Compared to
Presumptive Ranges in Senate Bill 56.
110. Id.
111. FISCAL NOTE SIX, supra note 106, at 2.
112. ALASKA FELONY PROCESS, supra note 32. The Council used data about
first felony B and C offenders included in the report’s database to report on
lengths of mean sentences to the legislature.
113. Memorandum from the Alaska Judicial Council on Blakely Data to the
House Finance Co-chairs (Feb. 16, 2005) (on file with the author) [hereinafter
Alaska Judicial Council Memo].
114. Id. at 5.
115. See FISCAL NOTE SIX, supra note 106, at 2.
116. See Alaska Judicial Council Memo., supra note 113, at 5; FISCAL NOTE SIX,
supra note 106, at 2.
117. Summary of new legislation prepared by Department of Law (July 20,
2005) (on file with author).
118. Id.
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Department’s statement could have been drawing on the sentence
in the legislative letter that says: “Rather, the bill is intended to
give judges the authority to impose an appropriate sentence, with
119
The
an appropriate amount of probation supervision.”
Department of Law phrase suggested that the department might
expect increased suspended sentences, with longer probationary
terms and greater exposure to the possibility of probation
120
However, the Department of Law’s fiscal note
revocations.
submitted on January 21, 2005 says that the Department does not
expect any increase in its own expenses associated with
121
implementation of the new sentencing scheme.
E. Defense attorney concerns
122
In the defense agencies’ fiscal notes, agency heads noted
concerns about the probability of increasing sentence lengths,
increasing overall incarceration, increasing numbers of defendants
on probation (with an associated increase in probation
123
revocations), and increasing appellate work.
VI. ACTUAL EFFECTS OF BLAKELY
A. Increased appeals
The most noticeable effect of Blakely in 2004 and 2005 was a
substantial increase in Blakely and Apprendi-related appellate
work. The clerk of the appellate courts estimated that the number
of appeals had risen substantially in twelve months between July 1,
124
2004 and June 30, 2005. In Fiscal Year 2004, the court of appeals
125
had a total of 219 filed cases. For Fiscal Year 2005, the total had
risen to an estimated 475 filed cases, a 117% increase during the
126
year.

119. ALASKA SENATE JOURNAL, supra note 97, at 0103.
120. See id.
121. ALASKA DEP’T OF LAW, FISCAL NOTE ONE, S.24-56, 1st. Sess., at 1 (2005)
[hereinafter FISCAL NOTE ONE].
122. ALASKA PUBLIC DEFENDER AGENCY, FISCAL NOTE EIGHT, S.24-56, 1st.
Sess., at 1 (2005) [hereinafter FISCAL NOTE EIGHT]; ALASKA OFFICE OF PUBLIC
ADVOCACY, FISCAL NOTE NINE, S.24-56, 1st. Sess., at 1 (2005) [hereinafter FISCAL
NOTE NINE].
123. FISCAL NOTE EIGHT, supra note 122, at 1; FISCAL NOTE NINE, supra note
122, at 1.
124. ALASKA COURT SYSTEM, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT 51 (2006).
125. Id.
126. Id.
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Most of the increase was probably due to Blakely-related
issues.127 The clerk’s office reviewed the cases on file during the
summer of 2005 for Blakely or Apprendi issues. In 191 files, one or
128
Those numbers
both of these cases were mentioned by name.
could still underestimate the effect of Blakely and Apprendi
because attorneys could have raised similar issues without
specifically naming the cases.
Appellate attorneys for both the Public Defender Agency and
the Department of Law agreed that appeals had increased
129
substantially. They suggested in interviews in 2005 that between
150 and 200 cases were filed in Fiscal Year 2005 that focused on
130
Interviewed again in November 2006,
Blakely and Apprendi.
defense attorneys and prosecutors perceived an undiminished rate
131
Attorneys
of new appeals and a rapidly accumulating backlog.
continued to file appeals for a variety of reasons, despite a total of
thirty-three separate appellate decisions on Blakely issues by
132
November 2006.
Several reasons have been cited for the continued high rate of
appeals. Both prosecutors and defendants appeared unwilling to
abandon Blakely arguments that were unsuccessful in the court of
133
appeals until the Alaska Supreme Court has decided them. When
federal grounds for relief were unsuccessful, new appeals have
been filed based on state grounds. If new federal issues were
raised, attorneys seem to be continuing to file cases until the
federal courts resolve the issues. The prosecutors and defense

127. Id.
128. Telephone Interview with Marilyn May, Clerk of the Appellate Courts
(July 2005). The data collection was possible because the court had one-time
externs available to review the cases. The court does not routinely track appeals
filed by the nature of the issues raised.
129. Telephone Interview with Quinlan Steiner, attorney, Pub. Defender
Agency (June 10, 2005); Telephone Interviews with Doug Kossler, attorney, Dep’t
of Law (June 10, 2005 and Nov. 2006); Telephone Interview with Linda Wilson,
attorney, Pub. Defender Agency (Nov. 2006).
130. Telephone Interview with Quinlan Steiner, attorney, Pub. Defender
Agency (June 10, 2005); Telephone Interview with Doug Kossler, attorney, Dep’t
of Law (June 10, 2005).
131. Telephone Interview with Doug Kossler, attorney, Dep’t of Law (Nov.
2006); Telephone Interview with Linda Wilson, attorney, Pub. Defender Agency
(Nov. 2006).
132. Telephone Interview by Larry Cohn with Linda Wilson, attorney, Pub.
Defender Agency (Nov. 2006).
133. Telephone Interview by Larry Cohn with Doug Kossler, attorney, Dep’t of
Law (Nov. 2006).
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attorneys noted that the amount of continuing appellate work
generated by Blakely has strained already limited resources.134
B. Smart v. State
On October 27, 2006, the court of appeals decided Smart v.
135
State. The court held that Blakely’s requirement of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt was essential “to a fair and lawful
determination of a defendant’s sentence under Alaska’s
136
and had to be applied
presumptive sentencing law,”
137
retroactively. The court also decided that Alaska’s retroactivity
138
law applied, rather than the federal law, and that the defendant
139
was entitled to a jury decision on aggravators.
The Alaska Judicial Council calculated the number of
offenders who might still be incarcerated in June 2007, based on
the data in its report on 1999 felony charges. Extrapolating from
the 1999 offenders and using the court system’s annual reports to
estimate increases in felony filings, the Council estimated that
about 120 offenders were likely to still be incarcerated who might
qualify for relief of some sort under Smart. Some of those
offenders would not qualify because their aggravating factors were
prior convictions or other factors that would not qualify for Blakely
relief. The Council did not estimate how many more offenders
charged before 1999 might still be incarcerated and might qualify
for relief under Smart, nor did it estimate how many offenders who
were on probation or parole would qualify for reductions in
140
suspended sentences and probation periods.
The Department of Law asked the court of appeals to stay the
retroactive application of Blakely while it petitioned the Alaska
141
The Public
Supreme Court to reverse the Smart decision.
Defender Agency did not file an opposition to the request for the

134. Telephone Interview by Larry Cohn with Linda Wilson, attorney, Pub.
Defender Agency (Nov. 2006); Telephone Interview by Larry Cohn with Doug
Kossler, attorney, Dep’t of Law (Nov. 2006).
135. Smart v. State, 146 P.3d 15 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006).
136. Id. at 17.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 27. A sizable part of the opinion was devoted to discussing the
Teague test used in federal habeas corpus litigation and why it did not apply to this
situation.
139. Id. at 35.
140. Further information available from the author.
141. Telephone Interview with Doug Kossler, attorney, Dep’t of Law (Nov.
2006).
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stay, but it did oppose the State’s petition.142 It also was preparing
its own petition to the supreme court for a review of portions of the
143
Smart decision. The appellate court clerk reported that the court
of appeals had stayed 256 appeals, another indication of its current
144
Blakely-related caseload.
C. Trial court effects
1. Jury trials for aggravators. Trial attorneys interviewed for
this comment reported very few jury trials on Blakely
145
aggravators. In Fiscal Year 2004 (July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2004),
the court showed 142 felony jury trials, which was 3.3% of all of the
146
felony cases filed. In Fiscal Year 2005 (July 1, 2004 to June 30,
147
2005), the 151 jury trials were 2.9% of all felonies filed. These
data do not suggest that at least during the first year after the
decision, the trial courts experienced any effects from new jury
148
trials related to Blakely.
2. Other trial court filings related to Blakely. Attorneys also
commented about other forms of litigation in the trial courts. Most
cases in the trial courts after June 24, 2004 have already received
the benefits of Blakely. Original actions for relief will be much
149
reduced as time passes. Attorneys did suggest that if the Alaska
Supreme Court upholds Smart, the trial courts will see substantial
150
new work. If Smart is upheld and the currently-stayed cases are
142. Telephone Interview with Linda Wilson, attorney, Pub. Defender Agency
(Nov. 2006).
143. Id.
144. Telephone Interview with Marilyn May, Clerk of the Appellate Courts
(Nov. 2006).
145. Interview information available from author.
146. ALASKA COURT SYSTEM, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT S-28 (2005).
147. ALASKA COURT SYSTEM, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT S-28 (2006).
148. Data for Fiscal Year 2006 felony jury trials were not available from the
court at the time this comment was prepared. However, the trend in felony jury
trials as a percentage of felony cases filed has gone steadily downward. In Fiscal
Year 2003, jury trials were 3.5% of all felony cases filed. ALASKA COURT SYSTEM,
2003 ANNUAL REPORT S-28 (2004). In Fiscal Year 2002, they were 4.3%.
ALASKA COURT SYSTEM, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT S-28 (2003).
149. Telephone Interview with Quinlan Steiner, attorney, Pub. Defender
Agency (June 10, 2005); Telephone Interviews with Doug Kossler, attorney, Dep’t
of Law (June 10, 2005 and Nov. 2006); Telephone Interview with Linda Wilson,
attorney, Pub. Defender Agency (Nov. 2006).
150. Telephone Interviews with Doug Kossler, attorney, Dep’t of Law (Nov.
2006); Telephone Interview with Linda Wilson, attorney, Pub. Defender Agency
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remanded to the trial courts for relief, attorneys and judges will be
kept busy determining the appropriate response for each offender.
VII. CONCLUSION
The discussion of Blakely continues to affect much of the
appellate caseload, but it seems to have less effect on trial courts
and trial attorneys. At this time, attorneys throughout the state
debate a wide variety of issues. Some of the issues are legal: Will
the supreme court uphold Smart? How will Alaska’s courts finally
resolve the other Blakely and Apprendi issues? Will the new law,
once subjected to appellate scrutiny, be found constitutional? Will
151
it comply with the Blakely requirements? Will the Booker case
152
eventually be found to apply to Alaska sentencing law?
Other issues are more tied to agency and system caseloads and
effects. Two and one-half years after the Blakely decision, the
question of increases in active sentence lengths has not been
researched.
Anecdotally, attorneys believe that judges are
imposing more suspended time and probation. One question is
whether petitions to revoke probation will increase because
offenders are subject to increasing probation supervision. Until the
higher appellate courts have an opportunity to review some of the
court of appeals decisions and until actual sentences imposed can
be researched, many of the questions will remain.

(Nov. 2006). Attorneys said that they were continuing to file new appeals.
Consequently, the number of stayed cases is likely to grow while the supreme
court is considering the petitions.
151. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). The Court found the federal
sentencing guidelines unconstitutional based on its decision in Blakely; its remedy
was to declare the guidelines voluntary.
152. Wool, supra note 28, at 3. Based upon the Booker decision, the author
observed that “[b]ecause the rulings in the remedial opinion are not based in the
Constitution but in the Court’s interpretation of the relevant federal statutes, they
have no binding effect on state systems. The states are free to choose a different
course, as is Congress.”

